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Occupational regulation has experienced a remarkable level of expansion over the past several decades and the public protection role of occupational regulation has generally been accepted as the logically justifiable rationale for its creation. Indeed a large body of economic literature has shown that free markets for professional services may not produce efficient outcomes resulting from market failures of information asymmetries, natural monopolies and externalities that harm the public. While common ground can be found in a market failure rationale for regulatory intervention, much of the regulatory power at the State level rests with occupational licensing boards, whose members consist of active participants in the profession being regulated. Licensing boards regularly meet to establish and maintain requirements for entry into hundreds of occupations. Scholarly research on the effects of this structure in occupational regulation have concluded that among its unwanted consequences is the creation of industry captured cartels, limiting competition and increasing costs to consumers, without a proportional welfare benefit in terms of quality or safety.
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